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Introduction
1. This article is about the question: are the constitutional financial guarantees given 
to the Provinces in the Republic o f South Africa congruent with the guarantees con­
cerning their autonomous position under the Constitution.
As the South African Provinces are for 96% of their income dependent on transfers 
from the national treasury in their 2001-2002 budgets, there seems ample reason to 
put the question.
In the first part o f this article the relationship between central and provincial govern­
ments as elaborated in the Constitution will be described.
In the second part the regulation o f the division o f total government income between 
the different layers o f government will be looked into and a conclusion on the above 
question will be arrived at.
* Dr. E.J.Ph. Roberts is a retired Dutch diplomat, specialising in comparable constitutional law with an 
accent on intergovernmental financial relations in composite states. He defended his thesis on "the 
Power of the purse" in the Law faculty of Leyden University in the Netherlands in 1996. He is at pres­
ent working as a researcher in the Law faculty of the University of Nijmegen. His e-mail address is: 
edw_roberts@yahoo.com
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I. National -  Provincial relationship as established in the Constitution
2. The Republic o f South Africa is a composite state. The component parts of the state 
are called Provinces. The 9 Provinces are enumerated in the Constitution (1996)1 of 
South Africa2. The Constitution does not typify the relationship between central and 
provincial government in words like "federal" or "commonwealth". It indicates this 
relationship quite neutrally with the word "sphere of Government". So Section 40,1 
reads: ”In the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local 
spheres o f government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.” .
The Constitution is the source o f all authority in the Republic o f South Africa. (S. 2) It 
may be amended by a majority of two thirds o f the national parliament plus a two 
thirds majority in the senate, which is called the National Council o f Provinces.
A Constitutional Court may review every law on its consistency with the Constitution.
The Principles o f  1993
3. The current Constitution o f 1996 was preceded by the post-Apartheid Interim Con­
stitution o f 19933, which presents the political agreement o f the South African popu­
lation on the main characteristics o f the constitutional design o f the Republic. The 
1993 Constitution was to be replaced by a new Constitution to be drafted by a Con­
stitutional Assembly.
The characteristics are spelled out in 34 Constitutional Principles laid down in Annex
4 of the Interim Constitution.
The Constitutional Principles are o f a lasting interest. Section 74 o f the Interim Con­
stitution o f 1993 provides that no amendment or repeal o f the Constitutional Princi­
ples shall be permissible. The new Constitution had to be certified by the Constitu­
tional Court as complying with the Constitutional Principles before it might be signed 
into law by the President. (S. 72 o f the 1993 Interim Constitution).
4. In the Principles democratic representation on all levels o f government, national, 
provincial and local is prescribed.
More than a quarter o f the 34 Principles deal with the powers o f the Provinces in rela­
tion to the powers o f the national government.
In the Principles the Constitutional Assembly is given the task o f defining the powers 
and functions o f national and provincial governments. Proposals for amendment of 
the powers o f the provinces as defined in the new Constitution were only to be sub­
mitted after the provincial legislatures had been consulted.. (Principle XVIII)
The national government of South Africa and the provincial governments were to 
have exclusive and concurring competences as well as the power to perform functions 
for other levels o f government on a delegation or agency basis.( XIX)
The general Principle for allocating powers and functions is that each level o f gov­
ernment is to function effectively. The allocation had also to be conducive to finan­
cial viability and an effective public administration which recognised the need for and 
promoted national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy and acknowledged cul­
tural diversity. (XX)
1 Act No. 108 of 1996
2 The nine provinces are: Eastern-Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern- 
Cape, Northern Province, North West, Western-Cape.(see S. 103, 1)
3 Act No. 200 of 1993
2
As regards the allocation of powers between the national and provincial governments 
the following supplementary criteria were to apply.( XXI, 1 -  5)
When the maintenance o f economic union or o f internal security is involved or when 
unreasonable action by one provincial government damages other provinces or the 
country as a whole the national government is empowered to intervene. Moreover the 
national government will act in matters of national economic policy, in the Republic's 
common market matter, in foreign affairs or where essential national standards are 
involved. Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function the 
legislative power over that function is to be allocated predominantly if  not wholly to 
the national government.
5. As regards provincial powers, the Constitutional Assembly got an either/or guide­
line in the Principles. The Provincial governments were to have powers allotted either 
exclusively or concurrently with the national government, inter alia
- for the purposes o f provincial planning and development and the rendering of 
services; and
- in respect o f aspects of government dealing with specific socio-economic and 
cultural needs and the general well-being o f the inhabitants of the province 
(XXI, 6).
The regulation o f local government is left to parliamentary statutes or provincial leg­
islation or both. But a framework for local government powers was to be set out in the 
Constitution. (XXIV)
So, the order to the Constitutional Assembly regarding the province's powers is rather 
vague: The provincial governments had to be empowered in matters concerning their 
town and country planning as well as concerning the well-being o f their populations, 
but the possibility o f the national government to step in had to be left open. However, 
Principle XXII mentions that the national government will not exercise its powers (be 
it exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the integrity of the provinces.
The Principles provide expressly for co-operation between national and provincial 
governments by stating that where mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or 
where it is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government 
service, the powers should be allocated concurrently to the national government and 
the provincial governments. (XXI, 7)
The dominant position o f the national government is underlined in Principle XXIII 
which mentions that in case o f a dispute between the national and a provincial gov­
ernment about concurrent powers which cannot be resolved by a court on the basis of 
the Constitution, precedence is to be given to the powers of the national government. 
So, it seemed to be the intention that the reserve-powers would rest with the national 
government.
6 . The Principles contain three prescriptions regarding finance.
- National, provincial and local government shall have fiscal power.(XXV)
- Moreover each level o f government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable 
share of revenue collected nationally, so as to ensure that provinces and local gov­
ernments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions allocated to 
them.(XXVI)
So, equity is to be related to the provision of basic services plus the execution of 
functions allocated.
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- An advisory committee is to be established which will weigh the share each Prov­
ince is to have in this division of nationally collected revenue taking into account a 
number of factors, that is to say the national interest, economic disparities between the 
provinces as well as the population and developmental needs, administrative respon­
sibilities and other legitimate interests.(XXVII)
In this so-called Financial and Fiscal Commission each province is to be represented. 
The 1996 Constitution and the Provinces
7. The Constitutional Assembly adopted a text for the new Constitution on 8 May
1996. This text was submitted to the Constitutional Court for certification. In its 
judgement o f 14 September the Court concluded that the constitutional text could not 
be certified as complying fully with the Constitutional Principles4. The main focus of 
its judgement was on provincial government matter, more specifically on the ques­
tion whether the constitutional text provided for the required legitimate provincial 
autonomy.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly amended the submitted text substantially 
and adopted the new version on 11 October 1996, which was then again laid before 
the Constitutional Court. Considering this amended text the Court found that the 
powers and functions of the Provinces were still less or inferior to those accorded in 
the Interim Constitution but that the disparity was not substantial. Therefore the Court 
concluded in its judgement o f 4 December 1996 that the Constitution did indeed com­
ply with the Constitutional Principles5. The certification o f the text thus being ob­
tained the President of the Republic signed the new Constitution into law on the 11th 
o f December 1996.
8. In the 1996 Constitution the concurrent and the exclusive powers o f the provinces 
are enumerated in attached Schedules 4 and 5 respectively. The Schedules are amend­
able in the same way as the Constitution itself, that is by a two thirds majority in the 
national Parliament and in the National Council of Provinces.
The powers o f the national government are not put in an attachment. Section 44,1 a ii 
of the Constitution provides that the national Parliament may legislate on any matter, 
including the matters allocated to the provinces under Schedule 4 but excluding those 
under Schedule 5. However, Parliament may even intervene in those exclusive pro­
vincial powers
- in order to maintain national security, economic unity, and essential national stan­
dards,
- in order to establish minimum standards required for the rendering o f services, or
- to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the in­
terest o f another province or to the country as a whole. (S. 44,2)
The first power o f a province is to pass a constitution and to amend it. (S. 104,1) 
Amendments have to follow the same procedure as amendments o f the national Con­
stitution, that is by a 2/3 majority in the provincial legislature.
A provincial constitution may not be inconsistent with the national constitution. (S. 
143,1) A province is, however, expressly empowered to differ in its provincial legis-
4 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996.1996(4) SA 744 (CC)
5 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the amended text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1997(2) SA 97 (CC)
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lative or constitutional structures and processes from the ones in the national constitu­
tion. (S. 143,1a)
A provincial constitution may not confer on a province any power outside the powers 
enumerated in Schedules 4 and 5.(S. 143,2)
The provincial constitution has moreover to be certified by the national Constitutional 
Court to be in conformity with the national Constitution before it may enter into 
force.(S.144,2) As long as a province is without its own constitution it can manage 
adequately on the default provisions for provincial governments provided in the na­
tional Constitution6.
Provincial power over local government
9. The Constitution allots provincial government the task to establish municipalities 
and to provide by legislative or other measures for the monitoring and support o f local 
government. (S. 155,6a)
A South African Province shares its power over the local level o f government in 
many instances concurrently with the national government like for instance in re­
gional planning and development, in urban and rural development and welfare serv­
ices, in environment, health services and housing. Also some parts o f chapters in 
which the Constitution reserves exclusive competence for the national government, 
some powers may be left to provincial government like police, language policy and 
media services. Next to that the province has competence over a list of local govern­
ment matter over which it has the exclusive right to control (Schedule 5, part B). The 
control of other local matter it has to share with the national Government (Schedule 4, 
part B). The competence in any matter concerning local government not mentioned in 
the Constitution rests with the national Government (S. 164).
The provincial government is empowered to intervene when a municipality cannot or 
does not fulfil a obligation in terms o f legislation (S. 139,1). However, the interven­
tion needs the approval o f the member o f the national Cabinet responsible for local 
government within 14 days (S. 139,2a). Also the National Council of Provinces has to 
approve the intervention within 30 days after its first sitting after the intervention (S. 
139,2c).
Conflict o f  laws
10. The national Constitution(1996) provides for an extensive regulation concerning 
conflict between national and provincial legislation.
It divides possible conflicts in two cases:
a) the ones between national and provincial legislation in areas o f concurrent power, 
and
b) conflicts between national legislation and the provisions o f provincial constitutions.
Ad a). In the case o f conflict of e x i s t i n g legislation in the areas of concurrent 
powers the effectiveness o f regulation is the determining criterion for the prevalence 
o f national power over provincial .When uniformity is required as in the case of 
norms and standards, frameworks or national policies the higher effectiveness o f na­
6 Only the province of the Western Cape succeeded in establishing a provincial constitution. It was 
certified in an unanimous judgement by the Constitutional Court on 18 November 1997 and was signed 
into law on 15 January 1998.
An attempt by KwaZulu-Natal to establish a provincial constitution was defeated in the Constitutional 
Court. by judgement of 6 September 1996. The attempt has not been pursued. (KwaZulu-Natal Certifi­
cation Case 1996 (11)BCLR1419(CC))
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tional legislation is presumed by the Constitution .(S. 146, 2 & 3). In other cases pro­
vincial law prevails.
When the question is the necessity of a n e w national law instead of e x i s t i n g 
provincial law and that dispute is submitted to a court, the court has to have due re­
gard to the rejection or approval of such legislation by the National Council o f Prov­
inces. I f  a court is not involved in the solution o f the question the provincial power is 
made fully dependent on the position o f the National Council o f Provinces (S. 146,6). 
Ad b). As regards a conflict o f law between existing national legislation and a provi­
sion o f a provincial constitution national legislation prevails in general. (S. 147,1)
If a dispute cannot be resolved by a court the national legislation prevails over the 
provincial legislation or constitution (S. 148).
11. The constitutional chapter on the regulation o f conflicts o f law finishes by laying 
down a rule o f interpretation. It prescribes in Section 150 that every court when con­
sidering apparent conflicts of law between national and provincial law has to prefer 
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation or the Constitution that avoids a con­
flict over any alternative interpretation that results in a conflict.
From this chapter it may be clear that the drafters of the Constitution (1996) wanted to 
set borders to the legal process in favour o f the political arena. This is also being 
made most clear in Section 41 in the Chapter on co-operative government where one 
may find the constitutional order to the courts to refer a dispute back to the organs of 
state involved when a court is not convinced that all other remedies are exhausted.
The role o f  the provinces in national legislation
12. The South African legislature is bi-cameral and consists of the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces.
The National Assembly has 400 members elected on the basis o f a national common 
voters roll and o f proportional representation.
The National Council o f Provinces is composed o f a single delegation o f ten delegates 
from each province, in total 90 members.
In a provincial delegation four delegates are special delegates and six are permanent 
delegates.
The special delegates are the premier o f the province, or any member o f the provincial 
legislature designated by the premier either generally or for any specific business be­
fore the National Council o f Provinces, and three other special delegates.(S. 60)
The introduction of special delegates in the composition of the provincial delegations 
allows for a measure o f flexibility in the political decision making and for the mobili­
sation o f a particular expertise when needed.
The political parties active in a province are entitled to be represented in the delega­
tion o f the province. The number o f seats to be allotted to each party are to be calcu­
lated by a formula given in the Constitution itself. (Schedule 3 B of the Constitution) 
The provincial legislature has then to decide how many of each party's delegates are 
to be special delegates, and how many permanent delegates. It will also appoint the 
permanent delegates nominated by the parties. These decisions have to be taken 
within 30 days after the results of the election for the provincial legislature become 
public. Permanent representatives in the Council chosen from among the members of 
the provincial legislature may attend the meetings o f that legislature but lose the right
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to vote. They remain member of the Council until a new election for the province they 
represent is held.
The three special delegates are appointed, as and when required, by the legislature of 
the province from amongst its members. Their designation has to have the concur­
rence o f the premier o f the province and o f the leaders o f the political parties entitled 
to special delegates.
Participation o f minority parties in the provincial delegations is to be ensured. (S. 61)
So, the members o f the National Council o f Provinces are not directly chosen by the 
population in the provinces, they are representatives o f political parties.
All the political parties represented in the National Council o f Provinces at the mo­
ment are also represented in the National Assembly. On both levels the African Na­
tional Congress party (ANC) is in the majority. However, to attain a two thirds ma­
jority in decisionmaking the ANC needs the co-operation o f an other political party.
13. The National Council o f Provinces has to consider all national legislation and may 
amend or reject it. It may moreover initiate or prepare legislation falling within the 
functional area o f Schedule 4 (= concurrent powers) or other legislation concerning 
institutional rules enumerated in Section 76 (3) 7 o f the Constitution (S. 68). It may 
not initiate or prepare Money B ills8.
The constitutional rules for the national legislation process provides for t w  o sepa­
rate procedures, one for an ordinary bill that does not affect the provinces and one for 
an ordinary bill that does affect provinces. The difference between the two procedures 
becomes visible in case o f a disagreement between both houses about a submitted bill.
In the case o f an ordinary a bill n o t affecting provinces rejection by the Council 
only necessitates the National Assembly to reconsider the bill which it approved ear­
lier. In these cases the National Council o f Provinces acts as a consultative body.
Their "no" may only result in procedural delay. In these cases each delegate in a pro­
vincial delegation casts his/her vote as a separate member and questions are decided 
by simple majority in the house.(S. 75)
As regards ordinary bills a f  f  e c t i n g the provinces, each province has one vote 
and agreement is reached when at least five provinces vote in favour. A bill is sup­
posed to affect provinces when it falls within the functional area o f Schedule 4 (= 
concurrent powers) or concerns certain institutional or procedural matters (see foot­
note 7).
In the case o f a conflict between the Council and the Assembly a Mediation Commit­
tee becomes involved.
The Committee consists o f 9 Members elected by the National Assembly out o f their 
midst, and 9 delegates o f the Council each representing a Province.
7 They are:
S. 65,2. Acts concerning the uniform procedure for the composition of provincial delegation
S. 163. Acts concerning organisations representing municipalities
S. 182. Acts concerning the function of the Public Protector
S. 195, 3 and 4. Acts concerning values and principles of the public service
S. 196. Acts concerning the Public Service Commission See
S. 197. Acts concerning terms and conditions of the Public Service
8 A Money Bill is a Bill that appropriates moneys or imposes levies or duties. A Money Bill may not 
deal with any other matter except a subordinate matter incidental to the appropriation of money or the 
imposition of taxes, levies and duties.
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In this procedure the National Council o f Provinces is able to stop the procedure and 
to torpedoe a bill definitively when the Mediation Committee is not able to come to 
an agreement or the National Council o f Provinces rejects the text agreed by the M e­
diation Committee, unless the Assembly is able to accept the agreed text or the origi­
nal one by a two thirds majority.
However in the case o f a conflict between the Assembly and the Council while proc­
essing a bill initiated by the Council, the bill lapses if  the Mediation Committee is un­
able to agree. Also when the Assembly rejects an other version o f the bill drafted in 
the Mediation Committee, the bill lapses. (S. 76)
So, the National Council of Provinces is in the strongest position in the case o f an or­
dinary bill affecting the provinces. The National Council o f Provinces is less privi­
leged when it concerns ordinary bills not affecting provinces.
Money bills have to be dealt with as ordinary bills not affecting provinces. (S. 76,4)
Co-operative Government
14. In the regulation o f the division o f powers between national government and pro­
vincial governments the position o f the Provinces is less clearly guaranteed because of 
the rather open-ended definitions o f central government power. This fits in with the 
intention of the drafters o f the Constitution (1996) to provide for co-operative gov­
ernment. In the Constitution a whole chapter - be it a short one - is dealing with this 
theme. (Chapter 3, Sections 40-41) In it the three "spheres o f government" national, 
provincial and local are defined as distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.
As first principles o f co-operation a few aims are mentioned which concern typical 
central government care, thereby binding the provinces to respect central government 
action. They are:
a. to preserve the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;
b. to secure the well-being o f the people of the Republic;
c. to provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for 
the Republic as a whole.
Then a few general principles are mentioned underlining the distinctiveness o f each 
sphere:
a. to respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres;
b. not to assume any power or function except those conferred on them in 
terms o f the Constitution;
c. to exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does 
not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of gov­
ernment in another sphere.
And, thirdly, general principles for intergovernmental relations, that is relations b e­
tween provinces and central government and between provinces mutually
a. co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by
b. i. fostering friendly relations;
ii. assisting and supporting one another;
iii. informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of 
common interest;
iv. co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another;
v. adhering to agreed procedures; and avoiding legal proceedings against 
one another.
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By Act o f Parliament structures and institutions for the promotion and facilitation of 
intergovernmental relations have to be given. This has been done by amongst others 
the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 9. In the executive field (see para. 15) co­
operative government is promoted by the many so-called M inMec Meetings. In such 
meetings Ministers consult their counterparts on the Provincial Executive Councils10.
Executive powers
15. The President o f the Republic o f South Africa is the head o f the national executive 
as well as the Head o f State. In the latter capacity he signs the laws or may lay them 
before the Constitutional Court to check on their constitutionality. The President exer­
cises his executive authority together with the other members o f the Cabinet. He is 
chosen by the National Assembly from amongst its members in the first session after 
its election. He then ceases to be a member o f the Assembly. He may be dismissed 
(S.89) in case of serious violation o f law or misconduct by a two thirds majority.
The Ministers are appointed by the President. He assigns their functions and may 
dismiss them. The Constitution prescribes that a maximum of two Ministers may be 
selected from outside the Assembly, the others have to be members and stay member 
when they are functioning as a Minister. When the Assembly presents a vote o f no 
confidence to the government the President has to appoint a new Cabinet, when the 
Assembly presents a vote of no confidence in the President the President and his cabi­
net has to resign and the Assembly has to appoint a new President.
In the Provinces similar constitutional rules apply as regards the executive function. 
The head o f Government is called Premier and his cabinet consists o f Members of the 
Executive Council (MEC's). All MEC's as well as the Premier have to be chosen by 
the provincial legislature out o f its midst.
The Constitution allots expressly the supervision o f provincial administration to the 
national executive. (S. 100)
If the national executive is o f the opinion that a province does not fulfil an executive 
obligation it may state to it the steps required to meet that obligation. The national ex­
ecutive may also take over the responsibility to fulfil that obligation but only when 
essential national standards, economic unity or national security are at stake or the 
interests o f another province or the country become into danger. Such intervention has 
to be brought to the notice o f the National Council of Provinces which has to approve 
within 30 days o f its first session after the intervention. After approval the National 
Council has to keep the situation under surveillance.
As regards the executive power o f the province, the Constitution charges the provin­
cial executive exclusively with the implementation o f all provincial legisla­
t i o n ^ . ^ )  Moreover, the provincial executive is responsible for the implementation 
o f all national legislation mentioned under the Schedules 4 and 5 (= concurrent and 
exclusive provincial legislative power, see para. 8). Outside areas mentioned in those 
schedules the executive power o f the Province has to be specified in the relevant Act. 
The executive power o f the Province however is dependent on an important proviso: 
a province has executive power only to the extent that the province has the adminis­
trative capacity to assume effective responsibility. The national government has to 
assist the provinces to develop administrative capacity required for the effective exer-
9 Act No. 97, 1997
10 This system of intergovernmental consultation has been capped by the recent decision of President 
Mbeki to hold meetings of Premiers every two months.
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cise of their powers. Terms and conditions o f employment in the national as well pro­
vincial civil service are regulated by national legislation 11.
Disputes concerning the administrative capacity o f provinces have to be referred to 
the National Council o f Provinces and must be resolved 30 days after referral. (S. 
125,4) This prescription makes the relationship between national and provincial ad­
ministration to a high degree dependent on the effectiveness o f the National Council 
o f Provinces.
II . Intergovernmental financial relations
Introduction
16. In the second part of this article the regulation o f the division o f total government 
income between the different layers o f government will be looked into in order to ex­
amine the constitutional and other legal guarantees for a sufficient income of the 
provinces which is congruent to their status under the constitution.
Chapter 13 o f the Constitution of South Africa lays down the rules for an equitable 
division o f revenue raised nationally between national, provincial and local spheres of 
government in order to provide basic services and exercise the functions allocated to 
each sphere. (S. 214,2d)
The Constitution also prescribes that the provincial governments have to be involved 
in the procedure for the division or revenue (S. 214,2) and establishes the guidelines 
for that division(S. 214, 2 a -  j)
In the same chapter of the Constitution the general policy and the administrative re­
quirements for the annual budgeting on the national and the provincial levels are laid 
down and Treasury-control on the implementation o f these rules is established.
The Fiscal and Financial Commission
17. In the decision making process concerning all these aspects o f intergovernmental 
financial relations an important role -  albeit a consultative one - is reserved for the 
Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC).
The Commission is established by the Constitution itself. (S. 220)
Its members are appointed by the President o f the Republic o f South Africa for a term 
of 5 years. They may be removed by the President on grounds o f misconduct, inca­
pacity or incompetence.
The Commission exists of a chairman and a vice-chairman who are full members, 
plus nine persons each representing a province and nominated by the Executive 
Council o f a Province, and two persons nominated by organised local government 
plus nine other persons. The members need to have the appropriate expertise.
The Commission is independent, only subject to the Constitution and the law, and has 
to be impartial.
It is to make recommendations and advise the three spheres o f government on issues 
that affect intergovernmental fiscal relations. Its main task is to advise on the re­
quirements for each level o f government in the division o f national income and thus 
contribute to the system of allocation.
11 S. 197,2
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The income position o f  the Province
18. The income o f a province consists o f its own resources, and transfers from the na­
tional government.
Provincial government is moreover allowed to raise loans in accordance with reason­
able conditions determined by national legislation. (S. 230,1) This legislation has not 
been established up to now. The provinces have a certain leeway in this respect as the 
Constitution allows them loans for current expenditure for bridging purposes during 
the current fiscal year and to be repaid within 12 months. In practice all intergovern­
mental cash is co-ordinated through a national instance, the Corporation for Public 
Deposits which results in lower borrowing costs.
As regards own resources: the South African Constitution empowers the Provinces to 
impose taxes. This taxing power is however rather limited. A provincial Government 
may not impose income tax, value added tax, general sales tax, rates on property or 
customs duties, it may impose flat rate surcharges on taxes nationally imposed 
except for the corporate income tax, value added tax, rates on property or customs 
duties. (S. 228) So only minor tax sources are constitutionally allotted to the Prov­
inces. The use o f the provincial taxing power may not prejudice national economic 
policies, inter-provincial economic activity or the national common market. Therefore 
a provincial tax has to be regulated by an Act o f the National Assembly. (S. 228,2)
At the moment the provincial governments in the Republic o f South Africa only raise 
4% of their expenditure out o f provincial taxes. They are dependent on transfers from 
the national government for 96% of their expenditure12. It is the intention to increase 
the own resources o f the provinces in the course o f time. An Act which regulates an 
intergovernmental process that must be followed by provinces in the exercise of their 
taxing power has entered into force on 10 December 2001 13.
In the meantime the rules concerning the division o f revenue nationally raised are the 
basis of financial security for the South African Provinces.
The Division o f  Revenue
19. As ordered by the Principles (see para. 6) the Constitution guarantees the Prov­
inces an equal share o f the revenue nationally raised (S. 214). This relates to all m on­
eys raised on the basis of national legislation. The Constitution guarantees in an equal 
way shares to the national and local spheres o f government.
As regards the Provinces and the local sphere o f government the Constitution adds the 
possibility (S. 214,1) o f other, extra allocations from the national governments' share 
which might be made under conditions. It thus created a constitutional basis for pro­
viding (conditional) grants to the provinces next to their annual equitable share.
The national government has to take the initiative in the division of the money. The 
division is to be performed by an Act o f Parliament. In that Act the equitable shares 
for the 3 spheres of Government (= vertical division) have to be inscribed as well as 
the division o f the provincial share over the 9 Provinces (= horizontal division) plus 
the special grants to the provinces.
The Constitution adds that provincial government, organised local government and 
the Financial and Fiscal Commission have to be consulted before the Bill is lodged. 
The Bill, being a money bill, has to follow the procedure of Section. 75 which re­
quires the approval o f the National Council o f Provinces. In the case o f disapproval a
12 Intergovernmental fiscal review 2001, p. 15
13 Provincial Tax Regulation Process Act (Act No. 53, 2001)
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conciliation procedure sets in which is in the end dominated by the national govern­
ment. (see para. 12)
The Bill leads to the so-called Division o f Revenue Act which is annually adopted by 
National Assembly at the same time as the annual Appropriation Act. The division of 
revenue is thus part o f the adoption o f the annual state budget.
20. The Constitution defines the criteria which have to be taken account o f when de­
ciding on the vertical and horizontal division o f national revenue. Among the first are 
the needs and interests o f the national government, determined by objective criteria; 
the next is: to ensure that the provinces and municipalities are able to provide basic 
services and exercise the functions allocated to them. (S. 214, 2d)
The following specific criteria are to be used for the horizontal division over the 
provinces:
- fiscal capacity and efficiency o f a province and its developmental and other 
needs,
- economic disparities within and between provinces,
- obligations in terms o f national legislation,
- the need for predictable and stable allocations, and
- the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies.
The criteria have to be applied in an objective way.
Section 227, 2 expressly forbids to deduct additional revenue raised by the provinces 
from their share o f revenue raised nationally. A province is obliged to raise for itself 
any resources that it requires - commensurate with its fiscal capacity and tax base - 
and provide for such activity by a provision in its Constitution. (S. 227,4)
The Constitution also provides that a province has to receive its equal share o f reve­
nue promptly and without reduction (S. 227,3) except in the case o f serious or persis­
tent material breaches of the prescribed measures to ensure transparency and expen­
diture control. (S. 216,2) In that case the Treasury, backed by the member o f Cabinet, 
may stop transfers. This refers to the requirements imposed on the provincial govern­
ments in the Public Finance M anagement Act regarding sound financial governance 
and budgeting14). The Act has been implemented for the first time in the 2000/2001 
fiscal year.
21. The actual division o f revenue is achieved in a process o f consultation before the 
Division o f Revenue Bill is introduced by the national government. The national gov­
ernment rounds this process o f consultation off by deciding on the amounts which 
will be inscribed in the Bill.
The process is regulated by the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations A ct15 which is de­
signed to facilitate and guarantee the system o f consultation to promote a fair budg­
eting process.
The Act has institutional aspects and procedural ones.
It established a Budget Council in which the national government and the provincial 
governments consult on fiscal, budgetary and other matters affecting the financial po­
sition o f the provinces. It is chaired by the national Treasurer and each province is 
represented in it by its M ember of the Executive Council for finance.
The Act also established a local Budget Forum in which national government, the 
provinces plus organised local government are represented.
14 Act No. 1, 1999 as amended by Act No. 29, 1999
15 Act No. 97, 1997
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The recommendations o f the Financial and Fiscal Commission - which have to be de­
livered ten months before the start o f each financial year -  are the basis for the delib­
erations in the Budget Council on the division o f national revenue. The recommenda­
tions are also sent to both houses of Parliament and to the provincial legislatures.
After the consultations and deliberations in the Budget Council have taken place the 
Treasurer introduces the Division o f Revenue Bill in the National Assembly. The Bill 
is to be accompanied by a memorandum explaining how the constitutional criteria 
have been taken into account, how the recommendations o f the FFC have been fo l­
lowed up, and which criteria and assumptions were used by the national government 
in arriving at the proposed shares. This memorandum is part o f the Review o f the 
Budget which accompanies the Appropriations Bill. The policy followed in the divi­
sion o f revenue in the year under consideration is set out in the Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Review, which complements the Budget Review.
The 2001 Budget
22. The preceding paragraphs 16 -  22 deal with the constitutional and other legal 
rules concerning the intergovernmental financial relationship in South Africa. This 
description is "illustrated" in the following paragraphs by an analysis o f the state 
budget for the fiscal year 2001 -  2002 with an accent on the Division of Revenue Act 
200116.
23. From the explanatory notes accompanying the budget, that is the Budget Review 
and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, it becomes clear that the Republic of South 
Africa is very much a country in development.
The main policy target o f the national 2001 -2002 budget is to spread in an equal way 
the delivery o f social and basic services so as to give S.A. citizens access to educa­
tion, health care, social development, housing, roads and the basics like water, elec­
tricity and refuse removal, and thus to repair the inequalities o f the foregoing period 
under the "Apartheids regime".
The elaboration and implementation o f this policy is very much the task o f the prov­
inces as well as o f local government.
24. As regards statistics: South Africa and is a middle-sized economy with an esti­
mated GDP in 2001 of R965,2 billion and has a population o f 43,3 million.
Estimated total national expenditure amounts in the fiscal year 2001/2002 to R258,3 
billion, or 26,2% GDP. The deficit is supposed to amount to R24,9 billion or 2,5 % 
GDP.
Total debt service costs in 2001/2002 are estimated to be R48,1 billion or 4,9% GDP, 
that is 18,6 % of total government expenditure in 2001/2002.
A large imbalance of the income/expenditure ratio exists between the national and the 
provincial governments. National government income is 2,3 times larger than its own 
expenditure. Total provincial own income is 27 times smaller than total provincial 
expenditure.
25. Income raised by the national government consists for 98% out o f tax-revenues. 
Total resources shared between the three spheres of government include the proceeds 
o f borrowing by the national government .
16 Act No. 1, 2001
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From the total resources to be shared the costs o f national debts is firstly deducted on 
the basis o f S. 214, 2a o f the Constitution. To that, a general national reserve o f a R.2 
billion. is added, which leaves an amount o f R208,2 billion for division in the fiscal 
year 2001 -  2002.
The Division o f Revenue Act 2001 allotted 40,2% of this amount to the national gov­
ernment, 56,6 % to the provincial governments and 3,1% to the local governments. 
The large provincial allocation is explained by the provincial responsibility for the 
implementation o f major social services, including school education, health (primary 
care and hospitals), social grants and welfare services, housing and provincial roads.
The transfers to the provinces will for 11,3 % consist o f conditional grants and for 
88,7 % of equitable shares17.
Conditional grants
26. Conditional grants have been introduced into the intergovernmental financial sys­
tem by the 1998-1999 state budget. Their aim is to provide for national priorities in 
provincial budgets, to promote national norms and standards, to compensate for cross 
province externalities and to support capacity building and structural adjustment. 
Sometimes the conditions include matching requirements.
The grants are made under the responsibility o f the relevant national department and 
the amounts are included in the expenditure side o f its budget.
Being part of the Division o f Revenue Act the allotment of conditional grants and 
their horizontal division is covered by the recommendations o f the Fiscal and Finan­
cial Commission and is subject o f deliberation in de Budget Council.
By far the biggest portion o f conditional grants relates to health (42%), followed by 
Housing, Finance, Education and Social development. About 10% of the expenditure 
o f the national Health department in its 2001/2002 budget is to be spent on condi­
tional grants to provincial governments.
27. Conditional grants may be divided in 2 classes:
Block grants 
= Specific grants
Block grants are large allocations to complement equitable share allocations. They are 
not earmarked for particular projects or spending programs. They are allotted to fund 
functions assigned to provinces. Sometimes they are allotted because provinces are 
not compensated adequately for spill-over effects through their equitable share.
Block grants amount to 50% of conditional grants.
There are 3 such block grants.
Two block grants are administered by the national department o f health providing 
general funding for hospitals in provinces in which central and/or academic hospitals 
are located, and also for funding professional training in health.
The third block grant is the Supplementary Allocation Grant administered by the na­
tional Treasury. This grant is general budget support grant to encourage good budg­
eting and financial management practices. This grant has also been used to consoli­
date various small grants and thus effected a streamlining in grant administration.
17 Budget Review 201, p. 242
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Specific grants support specific priorities and interventions by the national govern­
ment. They require monitoring. Payment may be withheld on failure to comply with 
the conditions attached.
There are two categories o f specific grants
infrastructural 
= recurrent
Infrastructural grants are allotted to assist provinces address infrastructure backlogs in 
education, health, roads and rural infrastructure and to repair flood damage.
These specific grants are administered by the national departments of Health and 
o f Housing together with the national Treasury. The greater part o f these specific 
grants (61%) concerns Housing.
Other specific grants fund recurrent spending. The major grants in this category target 
improvement of financial management.
The grants are administered by the national departments o f Education, Health and 
Social Development plus the national Treasury.
The Department o f Provincial and Local Government allocates grants to provinces 
to enable them to support municipalities in financial difficulties.
Other recurrent grants provide for direct support for service delivery. Among these 
grants is a grant for implementation o f an integrated strategy for the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS.
Development o f  the conditional grants-system
28. The South African grants-system is still in development. It is part of the restruc­
turing o f the state, which started under the Interim Constitution after the “A part­
heidsregime” The provincial governments needed time to become operational after 
1994 when they had to merge 17 different administrations into 9 new ones. Moreover, 
since the budget-process was fully centralised before 1994, provinces had to develop 
capacity and expertise, and set up their data-collecting which is still not fully harmo­
nised.
The money transferred under the conditional grants-system is being paid in accor­
dance with the payments schedules agreed between the national and provincial 
authorities. Neither national nor provincial authorities monitored actual spending. 
Provinces have only recently set up their systems so that they can report more accu­
rately on grants spending.
The task o f developing a system o f public finance, which provides transparency and 
accountability, falls on the national government which brought about the Public F i­
nance Management Act in force since April 2000 (see also para 20). The Public F i­
nance Management Act introduced accountability and formulates a framework for the 
management o f cash. It also established a system o f internal audit. The Act sets re­
porting requirements for conditional grants thereby improving planning and manage­
ment. Provinces will have to prepare implementation plans based on a policy frame­
work which has to be provided by the national authorities. This policy-framework has 
to include objectives as well as criteria for allocations between provinces. The Act is 
applicable to the national and provincial governments and the public entities under 
their ownership.
The main emphasis in the first year o f implementation has been on developing the ca­
pacity o f national and provincial authorities to implement the Act.
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Equitable shares
29. In the National Budget for 2001/2002 the equitable share for the provinces is in­
scribed under the heading Standing and Statutory appropriations. In the triennial esti­
mate the amount rises from R104,1 bill. in 2001/2002 to R120,2 bill in 2003/2004, 
which represents a rise o f 15% over a three-year period.
This amount is part o f the v e r t i c a l distribution o f total national government 
revenue over the three spheres o f government. The total provincial share reflects a 
political decision on the priority o f provincial functions amongst those o f national and 
local government. The total provincial share is about 25% larger than the nationall 
government's share, local government got an allocation which amounted to 2 ^  % of 
the provincial share.
The equitable shares are allocated between the provinces (horizontal distribution) in 
accordance with a formula based on the recommendations o f the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission o f 1996 and first practised in the Fiscal year 1997/1998.
The formula is a proportional distribution formula and attempts to capture the relative 
demand for services between provinces and to adjust for particular provincial circum­
stances. The formula is updated every year taking into account changes in statistical 
data and is reviewed every 5 years.
In accordance with the formula as implemented for the 2001/2002 fiscal year18 the 
total o f the provincial equitable share for the provinces has to be divided in 7 com po­
nents:
- 7% o f the amount is set aside and divided over the provinces taking into account 
each province's share in population
- 5% is set aside and divided taking into account the institutional costs o f running the 
government of the province
- 41% of the amount is allotted to the provinces for education purposes and shared on 
the basis o f average school age populations and the number o f pupils
- 19% is a health share and is to be divided in proportion to the population without 
access to medical aid funding
- 17% is the social security component to be divided over the provinces based on the 
estimated number o f people entitled to social security grants, weighted by using a 
poverty index derived from the latest income and expenditure survey
- 3% is a backlog component based on the distribution o f capital needs for schools 
and hospitals and of a share in rural population
- 8% is the so-called economic output component based on each province's share in 
total remuneration in the Republic of South Africa.
The amounts allotted to each province under each of the seven components are added, 
and their total is the equitable share o f that province. The provincial governments are 
free to spend the money allotted to them as their equitable share.
The result of the form ula19 is that more funds per capita are allocated to the poorer, 
rural provinces. Four of the nine provinces have an equitable share per capita, which 
is below the average. The province o f Northern Cape receives the largest share per  
capita, whilst the lowest equitable share per capita is allotted to Gauteng. The differ­
ence between the shares o f the two provinces is R. 13,3 billion, which is 12% of the 
total equitable share allotted to the provinces in the vertical distribution.
18 Budget Review 2001, p. 146/147
19 Budget Review 2001, p. 147
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30. By using the above formula the South Africa Government deviated from the rec­
ommendations put before her by the FFC for the 2001 -  2002 fiscal year. In those 
recommendations the FFC introduced a costed norm approach for the distribution of 
the equal shares over the provinces. The costed norm approach would have to be im­
plemented on funds needed by each provincial government to provide for basic levels 
o f service in primary health and social security services and in basic education. 
Moreover, institutional costs had to be separated form the "net" costs and had to re­
main at the lowest possible level.
The national government was only prepared to accept the costed norm approach as an 
analytical tool, where sufficient data were available. It rejected -  in accordance with a 
resolution adopted by the Budget Council - the approach as a criterion for decision on 
the amounts o f the equal shares.
Their main objection was that the costed norm approach would destabilise patterns in 
a slowly growing experience in financial governance. M oreover this approach seemed 
less appropriate to determine budgetary priorities which require political judgem ent in 
making difficult trade-offs. The use o f the costed norm approach would undermine 
the principle o f provincial budgetary autonomy and would weaken accountability.
The difficulty o f setting the standards, which would have to be implemented on a na­
tional scale, would arise and the difficulty o f equating policy goals and standards. The 
national government also found that the process would create a bias in favour o f the 
services that could be more easily costed over the ones that could not. A very practical 
objection was that the crucial data required for developing cost estimates were not 
available20.
Final Conclusion
31. The 1996 Constitution presents the possibility for the Republic o f South Africa to 
develop into a federal state.
In the division of powers the Constitution seems on first sight to favour the national 
government by its accent on national programs and the necessary uniformity o f legis­
lation. However, the rather broadly worded definitions o f the powers allotted to each 
o f the three spheres o f government may work out in favour of the provinces as well as 
in favour of central government. Much depends in this respect on the activity de­
ployed by the provinces and on the effectiveness o f the National Council o f Provinces 
acting on behalf of the provinces and their autonomy.
Especially the possibility that national law and provincial law may exist next to each 
other as long as inconsistency between both laws is avoided gives provincial legisla­
tures scope.
The constitutional prescription that legislation with regard to a matter which is rea­
sonably necessary for or accidental to the effective exercise o f a power concerning 
any matter in the area of concurrent power is for all purposes legislation with regard 
to that matter21, also offers the provinces leeway.
In the national legislation procedure the provinces find guarantees to hold their own in 
the national legislature.
However, federation-building does not seem to be one o f the main policy targets in 
South African politics. The lack of enthusiasm in most provinces to make use o f the 
possibility offered by the Constitution to adopt a provincial constitution is one indica­
20 Budget Review 2001, p. 235
21 Sections 44,3 and 104,4.
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tion o f this. The provinces lack the political environment o f their own to make this a 
natural ambition. The provincial legislatures are dominated by the same political par­
ties which dominate the national Assembly and which have mainly their sights on na­
tional policy targets.
This situation is scarcely surprising as the Republic o f South Africa was very much 
organised as a unitary state with strong central powers until the adoption o f the intro­
duction o f the 1993 interim Constitution. The legal and administrative framework for 
a federal-like state has still only partly been elaborated.
The constitutional regulation o f the financial relations between the national and pro­
vincial governments does not contribute to a budding out o f the South African prov­
inces into federal states. The Constitution favours the central government by guaran­
teeing it the revenues o f the main tax-sources, the provinces only got the broad guar­
antee that the central government is to share its income with them. As regards the cri­
teria for this sharing the national financial needs are underlined as first priority.
The fact that already 70% of the expenditure o f the provinces is on social security 
benefits and public service salaries, which are all detailed in national legislation, indi­
cates the very restricted financial leeway provinces have, whilst the push that the na­
tional government showed in developing the grants system indicates its willingness to 
use its financial superiority.
As regards the horizontal distribution over the 9 provinces, the disparity o f fiscal and 
economic capacity within and between provinces and the needs for stable and predict­
able allocations supporting development are formulated as determining criteria. H ow ­
ever, no fine-tuning of the equalisation concept is undertaken in the Constitution or 
the law.
Equalisation is mainly pursued by the national programs on health, education, housing 
etc. which are elaborated by the national government.
The actual decision on the amounts allocated in the horizontal distribution is left to 
the national cabinet. Effectiveness as general principle for the sharing o f power (see 
para. 4) is thus easily made into an important guideline for the vertical and horizontal 
division o f revenue by the national government. Arbitrariness is, however, somewhat 
checked by the transparency o f the division o f revenue process brought about by all 
the explanations which have to be given in accordance with the Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations Act.
As regards institutional aspects in the field of public finance the Constitution created 
the Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC) which could - in co-operation with the 
National Council o f Provinces - create for itself a consultative but authoritative role in 
the annual division o f revenue. It seems too early to conclude on the success o f this 
formula. The FCC devised indeed the method which is used for the horizontal divi­
sion o f income but its standing in future is still an open question. The national legis­
lature created a counterbalance by the Act which established the Budget Council. In 
this body the division o f revenue is actually negotiated between the national and pro­
vincial treasurers before the decision is taken in the national cabinet (see para.22 ).
In short, the constitutional regulation o f the financial relations between the South Af­
rican provincial and central governments leaves the central government ample op­
portunity to limit provincial power and does not seem supportive for a development of 
the Republic of South Africa into a federal state.
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ABSTRACT
The financial relationship between national
and provincial governments in South Africa
by Edward Roberts (May 2002)
The article is about the position of the South African provinces under the 
Constitution of South Africa, and more especially about the question does 
the Constitution guarantee them sufficient revenue as well as powers.
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